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Abstract  
We investigate empirically how the degree of democracy affects gender equality in 
education. The dataset contains 66 countries from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and 
South America over the 1991-2008 period. The results indicate that democracy 
advances gender equality in education while conversely less democratic regimes 
discriminate in education against girls. Democratization therefore has an important 
role in gender equality in education of girls, which, in turn, has a positive influence on 
economic development and growth. 
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1.    Introduction 
 
Education or human capital is a prominent influence on economic growth and 
development. In particular, educating girls increases human capital and growth 
(Schultz 1994, Knowles et al., 2002; Klasen, 2002; Dollar and Gatti, 1999). The 
human capital effect of educating girls is twofold. First, increased human capital of 
females directly increases incomes and growth. Second, there is an indirect effect 
through mothers’ education because of the positive influence of mothers on the 
education and health of their children (Schultz, 2002). An important question for 
economic development is therefore why gender inequality in education is non-
uniform.1
While there are private markets in education, schooling and education are 
among the primary responsibilities of government. In seeking reasons for gender 
inequality in education, we therefore focus on political institutions. 
 
Previous studies have found that education has a positive influence on 
democracy (for example, Castelló-Climent 2008, Barro 1999, Glaeser et al. 2004, 
Papaioannou and Siourounis 2005). Acemoglu et al. (2005) suggest however that after 
inclusion of fixed effects, there is no evidence that education enhances democracy. 
In any event, the influence of education on democracy is a long-run process. 
With democratization taking time, in the shorter run, with institutions in place and 
changing slowly, causality between education and democracy appears to be that 
political institutions influence policies and attitudes toward education.2
                                                 
1 One of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG), hoped for but not on line for 
achievement, was to eliminate gender inequality in education (UN 2008). 
 
2 On the related causal relation between income and democracy, see Gundlach and Paldam (2009).   
Income distribution, itself to an extent politically determined, can influence public spending on 
education, in particular for example on different levels of education. See for example Di Gioacchino 
and Sabani (2009) on income distribution and tendencies for public spending on levels of education in 
high-income countries. In taking political institutions as given, we do not seek to answer the question 
why countries differ in degrees of democracy. On this question, see Borooah and Paldam (2007).  
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We study how the degree of democracy affects gender equality in education. 
Our data is for 66 countries from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and South America 
over the 1991-2008 period. In section 2 we set out the background for our hypothesis 
linking gender equality to political institutions. Section 3 reviews previous studies for 
comparison. Section 4 presents the data and empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses 
the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Female education and political institutions 
In countries with limited democracy, rulers who seek to sustain political 
entrenchment are not interested in development of an educated middle class that will 
demand accountable and transparent government and democratic institutions. Because 
education is the basis for social mobility and the development of a middle class, less 
democratic political regimes may therefore avoid providing education for the poorer 
(and majority) segments of society.3
The positive relation between schooling or human capital and economic 
growth is well-established but does the degree of democracy also influence gender 
equality in education. Our hypothesis is that: 
  
 
The more limited is democracy, the greater is the bias against educating girls, and 
therefore the greater is gender inequality in education.          
 
Democracy is conducive to, or perhaps synonymous with, gender equality in 
education. Democracy facilitates gender equality through mobilization of women and 
                                                 
3 See Hillman (2007) for an overview of the incentives of non-democratic governments not to provide 
quality free-access education. Hillman and Jenkner (2004) describe the attempts of parents in low-




electoral accountability (Beer, 2009, p.218). Women can better organize, to express 
their views and interests, and to obtain and disseminate information. Women may 
lobby for improving their status through educational development and increased 
employment opportunities, and also women may in some cases be empowered to 
positions of leadership. Men may also want more educated women as partners, and 
want their own female children to receive equal educational opportunities. 
Democratic institutions provide greater freedom (De Haan and Sturm 2003) that is 
consistent with policies that do not discriminate by gender.4
While economic development results in improved female education and labor-
force participation, religious beliefs and other aspects of culture may discourage or 
prevent women from pursuing education (Dollar and Gatti 1999, Inglehart and Baker 
2000).  Colonial regimes allowed women to remain disadvantaged.
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4 Democracy may also influence gender equality in education through indirect effects such as openness 
to trade. Autocratic states trade less than democracies (Aidt and Gassebner, 2010). Trade openness 
appears to induce two opposing effects. First, trade induced growth has generated greater inequalities 
in education in Sub-Saharan African and Arab countries because increased demand for skilled labour 
has increased wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers (Baliamoune-Lutz and Mc 
Gillivray, 2007). By contrast, increased trade openness has reduced the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers by increasing the wages of unskilled workers. 
 Women have 
disproportionally been employed in low-skilled agriculture, for example, in cash crops 
plantations (Adams 2006). A primary reason why we expect gender inequality in less 
democratic countries is absence or disregard for the rule of law, and the distinction 
between strong and weak in determining people’s outcomes. Hillman (2004) has 
described Nietzschean behaviour as the strong being unconstrained by ethics in 
actions toward the weak. With women are naturally physically weaker than men, in 
Nietzschean low-income societies women can be expected to be the victims of male 
domination, which includes adverse discrimination in schooling. If the role of the girl 
5 Brown (2000) investigates the effects of colonization and democracy on enrolment for Middle 
Eastern, African, Asian, Central and South American countries. His results suggest that colonization 
decreased enrolment ratios in Sub-Saharan-Africa, despite a strong relationship between regime types 
and enrolment ratios in education. 
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or woman is no more than to bear children and to provide satisfaction and services to 
males, education of girls may not enhance the perceived benefits to men, who are the 
“strong” and dominate the women, who are the “weak”. Women can then also 
become objects to be purchased for use and traded (Di Tommaso, Shima, Strøm, and 
Bettio 2009). The uses to which women are subjected do not require education, or 
indeed education could be an impediment for achieving the objectives sought by men 
through submission of women. 
 
3. Prior studies 
Empirical evidence in prior studies on the influence of democracy on gender equality 
in education has been mixed. Brown (2004) employed the data of Barro and Lee 
(1993) on educational attainment. The dependent variable was the average number of 
years women attended school divided by the average number of years men attended 
school in 1990. Democracy was measured by the sub-indicators of POLITY III. The 
independent variables were mean values for each country between 1960 and 1990. 
The sample consisted of 105 high and low-income countries. The results suggested 
that only an executive-recruitment sub-component of democracy had a positive 
influence on gender equality in education.6
A study by Beer (2009) considered gender equality and political regimes. Beer 
considered also women’s representation in the population and labour force. Beer’s 
results suggest that democracy may have negatively influenced gender equality in 
educational attainment. Her dependent variable for gender equality in education is the 
difference between the average years of educational attainment of women and men. 
  
                                                 
6 Time from initiation of suffrage has been used to study educational opportunities for women (Beer 
2009). We do not use this variable because of ambiguities in the relation between the right to vote and 
democracy. In numerous low-income countries, people have the right to vote, or indeed may be 




Democracy is measured by the level and stock of the POLITY IV democracy indices, 
as well as the year in which women gained the right to vote. The sample consisted of 
179 developed and developing countries between 1960 and 2004. The results showed 
that countries with longer-term democracy and longer duration of women’s suffrage 
had higher proportions of female to male life expectancy, lower fertility rates and 
higher labour force participation rates, due to the ability to advance their interests 
through voting. However, both the stock of democracy and the year woman gained 
suffrage had a negative influence on gender equality in education, so contradicting the 
hypothesized positive relationship between democracy and gender equality in 
education. The results were sensitive to the inclusion of an illiteracy variable, 
exclusion of which turned the democracy variable to positive (Beer, 2009, p. 224). 
The empirical evidence on the influence of democracy on gender equality in 
education from the prior studies has inconclusive elements. 
 
4.    Data and empirical strategy 
4.1 Data 
We employ data on girls and boys enrolment ratios in education at the primary 
and secondary, and tertiary level. Enrolments at the primary and secondary level are 
measured by one variable. As noted, the dataset contains 66 countries from Africa, 
Asia, the Middle East and South America for the 1991-2008 period. The panel is 
unbalanced. We examine annual data in order to utilize all available data. 
Table 1 illustrates regional differences in the ratio of girls to boys in primary 
and secondary, and tertiary education. An enrolment ratio of 1 indicates parity 
between females and males and deviations below (above) 1 can be interpreted as a 
degree of male (female) advantage on the enrolment measure. Girls are most 
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underrepresented in South Asia and Africa. In Chad, for example, the enrolment ratio 
in primary and secondary education was 0.57 and in tertiary education 0.15. Gender 
equality has been most pronounced in Central Asia. In Mongolia, for example, the 
girls-and-boys-enrolment ratio in primary and secondary education was 1.11 and in 
tertiary education 1.75 on average. Regional differences in education are pronounced 
at the tertiary level: gender inequality is high in Africa (enrolment ratio 0.63 on 
average) and low in the Middle East (enrolment ratio 1.36 on average) and South 
America (girls-and-boys enrolment ratio 1.3 on average). The girl-and-boys 
enrolment ratios at the primary and secondary level increased from 0.88 on average in 
1991 to 0.96 on average in 2007. The girl-and-boys enrolment ratios at the tertiary 
level increased from 0.80 on average in 1991 to 0.97 on average in 2007.  
The means of measurement of democracy have been the POLITY IV and the 
Freedom House indices. The Freedom House Political Rights index takes on values 
between 1 and 7, with 1 indicating the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest 
degree of freedom. The POLITY IV democracy index takes on values between 0 and 
10 with 0 representing no democracy (full autocracy) and 10 representing full 
democracy. These indices have, however, been criticized on several grounds (Munk 
and Verkuilen 2002, Vreeland 2008, Cheibub et al. 2010). For example, Munck and 
Verkuilen (2002:28) arrive at the conclusion that Freedom House is an index “which 
[exemplifies] problems in all areas of conceptualization, measurement, and 
aggregation.” The POLITY IV index has been criticized for similar reasons, but “the 
usefulness of the POLITY IV dataset lies in its components” (Cheibub et al. 2010: 
Section 3.3). The POLITY index has five components: XCONST (Constraints on 
chief executive), XRCOMP (Competiveness of executive recruitment), XROPEN 
(Openness of executive recruitment), PARCOMP (Competiveness of political 
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participation), and PAREG (Regulation of political participation). In particular, the 
Chief Executive variable “provides useful information about whether the chief 
executive has unlimited authority, whether there is a legislature with slight or 
moderate ability to check the power of the executive, whether the legislature has 
substantial ability to check the executive, or whether the executive has parity with or 
is subordinate to the legislature” (Cheibub et al. 2010: Section 3.3). We will therefore 
employ the Chief Executive variable as a democracy measure. 
Cheibub et al. (2010) introduce a Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) measure 
of political regimes. The DD measure basically distinguishes between regimes in 
which executive and legislative offices are filled through contested elections and 
those in which they are not. The DD measure takes on the value 1 for democracies 
and zero otherwise. See Cheibub et al. (2010) for a more encompassing discussion on 
classifying democracies and dictatorships. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the association between the averaged XTCONST and 
the DD democracy indices and the girls-and-boys enrolment ratios at the primary and 
secondary level respectively. Democracy and gender equality in education at the 
primary and secondary level have been positively associated. In countries such as 
Chad and Yemen, the girls-and-boys enrolment ratios as well as the democracy 
variables display low values. In Mongolia and the Dominican Republic, by contrast, 
gender equality at the primary and secondary level and democracy was positively 
related. We do not show the respective figures for the girls-and-boys enrolment ratios 
at the tertiary level and the XTCONST and DD democracy indices. The positive 
relationship between gender equality at the tertiary level and democracy is somewhat 
more pronounced than the positive relationship between gender equality at the 
primary and secondary level and democracy. 
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4.2 Empirical strategy 
The panel data model has the following form: 
 
EFMit = α + β Democracyijt   
+ γ Time Trendt +Σk δ Regionik + Σl ε Religionil +Σm ζ ximt + η Colonyi + uit                     
 
with i = 1,...,78; j=1,...,3; k=1,...,5; l=1,...,6; m=1,...,3; t=1,...,19 
where EFMit  is the girls and boys enrolment ratio at the the primary and secondary and 
tertiary level for country i in period t. Democracyit describes the two alternative 
democracy measures: the Chief in Executive variable and the Democracy-
Dictatorship indicator respectively. We include exactly one of the two democracy 
measures. Time Trendt describes a linear time trend which considers the increasing 
gender equality in education over time. Σk δ Regionik describes a set regional dummy 
variables. The regional dummy variables take on the value of one when the 
considered country belongs to a particular region and zero otherwise. We distinguish 
between five different regions: Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America. To 
avoid multicollinearity between the region dummies, one of the region dummies must 
function as the reference category (here Africa). The estimated effects of the other 
region dummies must then be interpreted as deviations from the reference category. Σl 
ε Religionil describes a set religion dummy variables (see, for example, Dollar and 
Gatti 1999, and Inglehart and Baker 2000). The religion dummy variables take on the 
value of one when a particular religion dominated the considered country and zero 
otherwise. We distinguish between seven different religions: Protestant, Orthodox, 
Roman Catholicism, Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism and Indigenous Religion.7
                                                 




reference category is Protestant (including Anglicans and all other types of Christians 
who are not Roman Catholic).8 Protestantism led to better education (Becker and 
Woessmann 2009, 2010). We therefore expect negative influences of the religion 
dummies on gender equality in education compared to the reference category 
Protestant. Colonyi describes a dummy variable that takes on the value one when the 
respective country was a British or French colony and zero otherwise. We expect a 
negative influence of the colony variable on the girls-and-boys enrolment ratios in 
education.9
                                                 
8 The British introduced Christianity to the African and Asian colonies. Most of the African countries 
are primarily Anglican or protestant and some countries follow their own variants of Christianity such 
as Independent Black Christian etc.  
 Σm ζ ximt describes a vector of economic control variables. Following the 
related studies on democracy and education we include GDP per capita (Dollar and 
Gatti 1999, Klasen 2002). Gender equality in education is expected to increase with 
GDP per capita. We also include trade openness (as a share of GDP). The predicted 
influence of trade-openness on gender equality on education is ambiguous. Higher 
trade openness could decrease gender equality because in several developing 
countries unskilled females have been employed in labor intensive export industries 
(e.g., Cagatay and Ozler 1995, Fontana and Wood 2000, Balliamoune-Lutz and 
McGillvray 2007). By contrast, higher trade openness could also increase gender 
equality because trade openness is expected to narrow the wage gap between skilled 
and unskilled workers and men and women. Higher relative wages may give women 
access to educational opportunities. We also include several other economic control 
variables which are not available, however, for the entire sample: employment in 
agriculture (as a share of total employment) and government expenditure per student 
at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Including these variables significantly 
reduces the sample though it does not change the inferences at all. We therefore 
9 Brown (2000) illustrates the effect of colonialism on enrolment and Cooray (2009) the influence of 
colonialism on the adult literacy rate. 
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discuss the influence of employment in agriculture and government expenditure on 
education in the robustness tests section. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of all 
variables included. 
We now turn to our choice of estimation procedure. The Chief in Executive is 
entirely time-invariant and the Democracy-Dictatorship variable is time-invariant for 
several countries of our sample over the 1991-2008 period. For this reason, no 
additional fixed country effects can be included.  We therefore estimate the model 
with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors and include with fixed 
region effects.  
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Basic results 
Table 3 illustrates the regression results for education at the primary and 
secondary level. The control variables display the expected signs and are statistically 
significant in most cases. The linear time trend has a positive sign and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The numerical meaning of the coefficient is that the girls-
and-boys enrolment ratio in primary and secondary education increased by about 0.35 
percentage points per year. The regional dummy variables are statistically significant 
at the 1% or 5% level and mostly have positive signs. In column (2) and (4) the Latin 
American variable has, however, a negative sign which may well arise because of 
correlation with other explanatory variables. The regional dummy variables indicate 
that the girls-and-boys enrolment ratios have been higher in Asia and the Middle East 
compared to Africa (reference category). The religion dummy variables are 
statistically significant at the 1% level (the Roman Catholic dummy is statistically 
significant at the 10% level in column 2) and indicate that girls-and-boys enrolment 
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ratios have been lower in countries with orthodox, Roman Catholic, Buddhism, Islam, 
Hinduism and Indigenous religion compared to countries with Protestant religion 
(reference category). The log GDP per capita has the expected positive sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (2) and (4) and. It shows that the 
girls-and-boys enrolment ratios increased by about four percentage points when GDP 
per capita increased by 1%. Trade openness is statistically significant at the 1% level 
in columns (2) and (4) and has had positive influence on gender equality in education. 
The numerical meaning of the coefficients it that the girls-and-boys enrolment ratios 
increased by about 0.06 percentage points when trade as a share of GDP increased by 
one percentage point. The colony variable displays the expected negative sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In former colonies, the enrolment ratios have 
been about five percentage points lower than in non-former colonies. 
The results in Table 3 show that democracy has had a positive influence on 
gender equality in education: the coefficient of the Chief in Executive variable has a 
positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) and (2). The 
numerical meaning of the coefficient in column (1) is that a corresponding increase of 
the variable Chief in Executive variable by one point would increase the girls-and-
boys enrolment ratio in primary and secondary education by about 2.0 percentage 
points. The numerical effect is smaller in column (2). The Democracy-Dictatorship 
variables in columns (3) and (4) have the expected positive signs but the coefficient in 
column (3) lacks statistical significance. The numerical meaning of the coefficient in 
column (4) is that a corresponding the girls-and-boys enrolment ratio in primary and 
secondary education was about three percentage points higher in democracies 
compared to dictatorships (column 4). 
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Table 4 illustrates the regression results for education at the tertiary level. The 
control variables again display the expected signs. The linear time trend does not, 
however, turn out to be statistically significant. The log GDP per capita and trade 
openness variables are again statistically significant at the 1% level, and they are 
numerically even more important than in Table 3. The democracy variables again turn 
out to be statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1), (2) and (4). The 
results suggest that the girls-and-boys-enrolment ratio increased by about eight 
percentage points when the Chief in Executive variable increased by one point 
(columns 1 and 2), was about 17 percentage points higher in democracies compared to 
dictatorships (column 4). 
 
5.2 Robustness Tests 
We checked the robustness of the results in several ways. The results 
presented in Tables 3 and 4 could suffer from omitted variable bias. We shall 
therefore include further (economic) control variables. We have included employment 
in agriculture (as a share of total employment) because employment in agriculture has 
been traditionally associated with greater gender and income inequality in favour of 
males. Table 5 shows that employment in agriculture has negatively influenced 
gender equality in education at the primary and secondary level. Employment in 
agriculture has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level in columns (1) and (2) but does not turn out to be statistically significant in 
columns (3) and (4). In any event, including employment in agriculture significantly 
reduces the sample but does not change the inferences regarding the democracy 
variables at all.  
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Government expenditure on education may well influence gender equality in 
education. We have therefore included government expenditure per student at the 
primary and secondary and tertiary levels respectively. Including these variables 
reduces the sample size to about 200 observations. Government expenditure at the 
primary, secondary and tertiary level has the expected positive signs and is 
statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level. In any event, including government 
expenditure per student at the primary and secondary and tertiary level does not 
change the inferences regarding the democracy variables at all (results not shown). 
The model could also be estimated including a lagged dependent variable, 
employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We have therefore 
employed the estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
and collapsed the instruments as suggested by Roodman (2006). The Arellano and 
Bond tests indicate, however, that the dynamic models are misspecified: the error 
terms of the dynamic models are neither free of first nor second order autocorrelation. 
The reason for the misspecification of the dynamic models is very likely the strongly 
unbalanced panel. 
Democracies can be coded more expansively. Cheibub et al. (2010) have 
conservatively coded countries as democracy only if there has been alternation in 
power. Some countries appear, however, to have "contested" elections for the 
executive and legislature, but there has never been an alternation of the government in 
power. The data by Cheibub et al. (2010) also allow considering these cases as 
democracies in addition to their conservative coding. We have included the more 
expansive democracy coding. Results suggest that the more expansive democracy 




The sample contains three high income countries: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates. We have excluded these countries in order to investigate 
whether the results are sensitive to their exclusion/inclusion. Excluding them does not 
change the inferences at all: t-statistics of the democracy variables even somewhat 
increase. 
 We have estimated cross sections for several years. Table 6 shows the results 
for 1991 and Table 7 shows the results for 2003 respectively. The results for 1991 are 
meaningful because 1991 is the first year for which data on girls-and-boys enrolment 
ratios in education are available. The results for 2003 are meaningful because for 
2003 data are available for a maximum number of countries. We have kept the 
number of explanatory variables small in order to preserve acceptable degrees of 
freedom. The results in Table 6 show that the Chief in Executive variable is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in column (1) but lacks statistical significance 
in column (3). The Democracy-Dictatorship variables do not turn out to be 
statistically significant in Table 6. The results in Table 7 suggest that democracy has 
had a positive influence on gender equality in education. The democracy variables are 
statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (2) and (3) and at the 1% level in 
column (1). 
 
6    Conclusion 
 Numerous studies have focused on the different disadvantages of government 
decisions in countries with limited democratic institutions. Such governments have 
been shown to resist economic development in various ways (Doucouliagos and 
Paldam, 2008; Hillman, 2007). Using measures of democracy, we have found that the 
less democracy there is, the greater the discrimination against females in education. 
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Given the benefits of educating girls, we have therefore identified another significant 
disadvantage of limited or absent democracy in low-income countries. 
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Table A1: Data Description and Source: 
Variable Source 
Enrolment ratio of girls in primary and 
secondary education/enrolment ratio of boys in 
primary and secondary education 1990-2008 
 
World Development Indicators 2010 
Enrolment ratio of girls in tertiary education/ 
enrolment ratio of boys in tertiary education 
1990-2008 
World Development Indicators 2010. 
Polity IV constraints on chief executive  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm#nam 
(downloaded  January 2010). 
Democracy-Dictatorship dummy variable 
1990-2008: 
Dummy variable coded 1 if the regime 
qualifies as democratic. The conditions for this 
variable are the following: 
democracy=1 if 
exselec <2 (and) 
legselec=2 (and) closed=2 (and) 
dejure=2 (and) defacto=2 (and) defacto2=2 
(and) lparty=2 (and) 
type2=0 (and) 
incumb=0 
Cheibub J, Gandhi J and Vreeland J (2010). 
Regional dummy variables: Africa, Asia, 
Middle East and South America with Africa as 
the benchmark group. 
The Encyclopaedia of World Geography (1994)  Bateman 
G and Egan (Eds.), Andromeda Oxford Limited, England.   
 
Religion dummy variables: seven categories - 
Protestant, Orthodox, Roman Catholicism, 
Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism and Indigenous 
Religion  with Protestant as the benchmark 
group. 
The Encyclopaedia of World Geography (1994)  Bateman 
G and Egan V (Eds.), Andromeda Oxford Limited, 
England.   
 
Colonial State: dummy variable coded 1 if  a 
country was a British or French colony and 
zero otherwise 
   Freedom  House 2008 :    
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&cou
ntry=7460&year=2008) (downloaded November 2008). 
 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) World Development Indicators 2010. 
Trade % of GDP World Development Indicators 2010. 
Employment in agriculture % of total 
employment 
World Development Indicators 2010. 
Expenditure per student primary % of GDP per 
capita 
Expenditure per student secondary % of GDP 
per capita 
Expenditure per student tertiary % of GDP per 
capita 








Figure 1: Girls-and-Boys Enrolment Ratio in Primary and Secondary Education and 










































































Source: Worldbank (2010) and Marshall and Jaggers (2006) 
 
 
Figure 2: Girls-and-Boys Enrolment Ratio in Primary and Secondary Education and 
















































































Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin,  Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, 
Chad, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lao, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Malawi, 
Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, 




















Table 1: The Ratio of Girls and Boys in Primary and Secondary and Tertiary 
Education 






















Middle East       
Algeria 0.95 5 1.26 4 0 19 
Bahrain 1.03 9 1.97 6 0 19 
Iran 0.96 8 0.96 10 0 19 
Jordan 1.01 9 1.08 8 0 19 
Libya 1.04 4 1.04 5 0 19 
Morocco 0.84 9 0.77 10 0 19 
Saudi Arabia 0.89 2 1.44 9 0 19 
Syria 0.93 10 0.65 1 0 19 
Tunisia 0.99 8 1.20 9 0 19 
UAE 1.00 10 2.99 7 0 19 
Yemen 0.58 6 0.34 5 0 19 
Central Asia       
China 0.97 5 0.87 6 0 18 




      
Bangladesh 1.07 3 0.52 9 0.89 19 
Cambodia 0.85 10 0.44 8 0 19 
India 0.83 10 0.68 8 1 19 
Indonesia 0.97 9 0.83 6 0.53 19 
Lao 0.82 10 0.61 9 0 19 
Nepal 0.84 10 0.34 6 0.68 19 
Malaysia 1.03 9 1.19 9 0 19 
Maldives 1.01 8 1.58 3 0.05 19 
Pakistan 0.77 5 0.80 7 0.53 19 
Philippines 1.02 10 1.07 7 1 19 
Sri Lanka 1.03 3 0.55 1 1 19 
Thailand 1.02 9 1.16 10 0.84 19 
Vietnam 0.93 3 0.74 3 0 19 
South America       
Argentina 1.02 9 1.50 9 1 19 
Bolivia 0.97 8 0.55 1 1 19 
Brazil 1.03 8 1.29 9 1 19 
Chile 0.99 10 0.94 9 1 19 
Colombia 1.04 11 1.08 11 1 19 
Costa Rica 1.02 11 1.09 8 1 19 
Cuba 1.00 12 1.49 12 0 19 
Dominican 
Republic 
1.05 10 1.59 2 1 19 
Ecuador 1.00 10 1.22 1 0.89 19 
El Salvador 0.98 11 1.21 10 1 19 
Guatemala 0.90 10 0.81 4 1 19 
Jamaica 1.01 9 1.79 5 1 19 
Nicaragua 1.04 10 1.05 4 1 19 
Panama 1.00 10 1.64 9 1 19 
Paraguay 0.96 10 1.34 9 1 19 
Peru 0.99 11 1.03 6 0.42 19 
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1.02 9 1.36 8 1 19 
Uruguay 1.05 9 1.78 3 1 19 
Africa       
Benin 0.65 8 0.23 4 0.95 19 
Botswana 1.02 9 0.84 7 0 19 
Burundi 0.84 6 0.40 10 0.37 19 
Cameroon 0.84 8 0.68 6 0 19 
Chad 0.57 10 0.15 5 0 19 
Comoros 0.87 7 0.76 4 1 19 
Congo 0.87 5 0.22 6 0.26 19 
Ethiopia 0.72 10 0.30 10 0 19 
Ghana 0.91 11 0.45 9 0.84 19 
Kenya 0.96 10 0.57 6 0.58 19 
Lesotho 1.08 10 1.43 8 0 19 
Malawi 0.94 10 0.44 10 0.79 19 
Mauritania 0.96 10 0.28 7 0.05 19 
Mauritius 0.98 9 1.15 10 1 19 
Niger 0.67 10 0.31 5 0.63 19 
Nigeria 0.81 9 0.63 4 0.53 19 
Senegal 0.85 10 0.51 3 0.47 19 
Sierra Leone 0.75 3 0.40 2 0.63 19 
Sudan 0.87 8 0.91 3 0 19 
South Africa 1.01 11 1.05 10 0 19 
Uganda 0.94 11 0.52 7 1 19 
Zimbabwe 0.95 8 0.57 5 0 19 























Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev Min Max Source 
Girls/Boys in Primary and 
Secondary Education (Ratio) 
565 0.94 0.12 0.42 1.23 Worldbank (2010) 
Girls/Boys in Tertiary 
Education (Ratio) 
436 0.99 0.54 0 4.0251 Worldbank (2010) 
POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive 
1235 4.75 1.93 1 7 Marshall and 
Jaggers (2006) 
Democracy-Dictatorship 1254 0.48 0.50 0 1 Cheibub et al. 
(2010) 
GDP per capita (constant 
prices) 
1209 2228.25 3386.98 102.29 25192.33 Worldbank (2010) 
Trade Openness 
(as a share of GDP) 
1185 0.74 0.40 0.11 2.20 Worldbank (2010) 
Africa 1254 0.35 0.48 0 1 Own Calculation 
Asia 1254 0.23 0.42 0 1 Own Calculation 
Middle East 1254 0.15 0.36 0 1 Own Calculation 
Latin America 1254 0.27 0.45 0 1 Own Calculation 
Protestant 1254 0.14 0.34 0 1 Own Calculation 
Orthodox 1254 0.02 0.12 0 1 Own Calculation 
Roman Catholic 1254 0.32 0.47 0 1 Own Calculation 
Buddhism 1254 0.36 0.48 0 1 Own Calculation 
Islam 1254 0.11 0.31 0 1 Own Calculation 
Hinduism 1254 0.05 0.21 0 1 Own Calculation 
Indigenous Religion 1254 0.02 0.12 0 1 Own Calculation 
Colony 1254 0.63 0.48 0 1 Own Calculation 
Employment in Agriculture 
(as a share of total 
employment) 
477 25.65 19.25 0 89.3 Worldbank (2010) 
Government expenditure per 
student primary 
(as a share of GDP per capita) 
279 13.70 6.64 2.20 51.14 Worldbank (2010) 
Government expenditure per 
student secondary 
(as a share of GDP per capita) 
250 19.95 13.65 3.89 81.05 Worldbank (2010) 
Government expenditure per 
student tertiary 
(as a share of GDP per capita) 
218 116.77 217.26 8.49 1295.08 Worldbank (2010) 












Table 3: Regression results. Dependent variable: Girls/Boys in Primary and 
Secondary Education (Ratio) 
OLS with robust standard errors 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive 0.0225*** 0.0164***   
 [6.98] [5.37]   
Democracy-Dictatorship   0.0102 0.0304*** 
   [0.85] [3.34] 
Linear Trend 0.0044*** 0.0035*** 0.0040*** 0.0029*** 
 [3.57] [3.89] [3.04] [3.17] 
Asia 0.0659*** 0.0397** 0.0727*** 0.0457*** 
 [4.75] [2.50] [5.21] [3.32] 
Middle East 0.1325*** 0.0670*** 0.0849*** 0.0422** 
 [7.25] [3.30] [4.61] [2.10] 
Latin America 0.1044*** -0.0799*** 0.1283*** -0.0718*** 
 [10.76] [4.54] [11.66] [4.20] 
Orthodox  -0.2008***  -0.2346*** 
  [8.69]  [10.43] 
Roman Catholic  -0.0211*  -0.0478*** 
  [1.71]  [4.18] 
Buddhism  -0.1236***  -0.1454*** 
  [10.21]  [11.26] 
Islam  -0.0854***  -0.1199*** 
  [4.21]  [6.83] 
Hinduism  -0.1525***  -0.1577*** 
  [8.89]  [9.21] 
Indigenous Religion  -0.2636***  -0.2921*** 
  [12.99]  [13.91] 
log GDP per capita  0.0408***  0.0428*** 
  [9.03]  [8.86] 
Trade Openness  0.0588***  0.0665*** 
  [6.03]  [6.31] 
Colony  -0.0697***  -0.0754*** 
  [7.16]  [7.18] 
Constant 0.7069*** 0.5992*** 0.8172*** 0.6763*** 
 [28.57] [14.52] [39.47] [18.08] 
Obs. 557 524 565 531 
R-Squared 0.30 0.66 0.23 0.64 












Table 4: Regression results. Dependent variable: Girls/Boys in Tertiary Education 
(Ratio). 
OLS with robust standard errors 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive 0.0757*** 0.0939***   
 [6.25] [6.85]   
Democracy-Dictatorship   0.0053 0.1682*** 
   [0.11] [3.57] 
Linear Trend 0.008 0.0018 0.0074 0.001 
 [1.23] [0.32] [1.12] [0.17] 
Asia 0.2959*** 0.1417*** 0.2900*** 0.1398*** 
 [6.20] [3.67] [5.28] [2.78] 
Middle East 0.9426*** 0.4779*** 0.7396*** 0.3140*** 
 [9.13] [6.55] [7.53] [4.72] 
Latin America 0.5858*** -0.1069 0.6662*** -0.0828 
 [13.28] [1.38] [14.67] [0.90] 
Orthodox  0.2217**  0.0217 
  [2.27]  [0.21] 
Roman Catholic  0.1417**  0.0137 
  [2.52]  [0.20] 
Buddhism  0.013  -0.1324** 
  [0.23]  [2.38] 
Islam  0.1578*  -0.0337 
  [1.86]  [0.35] 
Hinduism  -0.2393***  -0.2486*** 
  [3.97]  [4.17] 
Indigenous Religion  -0.2237***  -0.3829*** 
  [4.84]  [7.68] 
log GDP per capita  0.2470***  0.2524*** 
  [10.30]  [9.84] 
Trade Openness  0.1585***  0.2415*** 
  [3.62]  [4.59] 
Colony  -0.0323  -0.0651 
  [0.68]  [1.23] 
Constant 0.1522* -1.5008*** 0.5298*** -1.0686*** 
 [1.67] [7.76] [5.98] [5.72] 
Obs. 433 407 436 409 
R-Squared 0.39 0.66 0.32 0.62 












Table 5: Robustness Tests. Dependent variable: Girls/Boys in Primary and Secondary 
and Tertiary Education (Ratio). Employment in Agriculture included. 
OLS with robust standard errors 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 





POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive 0.0194***  0.0913***  
 [4.42]  [2.77]  
Democracy-Dictatorship  0.0623***  0.2498*** 
  [4.85]  [2.70] 
Linear Trend 0.0011 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0026 
 [0.82] [0.50] [0.03] [0.39] 
Asia 0.0198 0.0063 0.0234 -0.0428 
 [0.80] [0.24] [0.32] [0.39] 
Middle East 0.0379 0.0192 0.4563*** 0.2943** 
 [1.10] [0.53] [3.13] [2.41] 
Latin America -0.0578** -0.0882*** -0.1508 -0.2845** 
 [2.48] [3.90] [1.47] [2.27] 
Orthodox -0.1459** -0.2134*** -0.0132 -0.4438* 
 [2.59] [3.93] [0.04] [1.77] 
Roman Catholic 0.0184 -0.0219 0.1764 -0.0136 
 [0.88] [1.17] [1.42] [0.15] 
Buddhism -0.043 -0.0882*** -0.0082 -0.2597** 
 [1.60] [3.20] [0.05] [2.55] 
Islam 0.0263 -0.0268 0.2254 -0.0715 
 [0.71] [0.79] [1.08] [0.48] 
Hinduism -0.1088*** -0.1604*** -0.1848 -0.4240*** 
 [4.31] [5.45] [1.51] [3.02] 
Indigenous Religion ... ... ... ... 
 ... ... ... ... 
log GDP per capita 0.0126* 0.0127* 0.1818*** 0.1467** 
 [1.91] [1.80] [2.64] [2.20] 
Trade Openness 0.0521*** 0.0563*** 0.2024*** 0.2919*** 
 [4.26] [4.46] [3.29] [4.53] 
Colony -0.0387** -0.0489*** -0.0869 -0.1445** 
 [2.38] [3.33] [1.01] [2.11] 
Employment in Agriculture -0.1630*** -0.1786*** -0.0896 -0.3114 
 [3.29] [3.49] [0.33] [1.22] 
Constant 0.8038*** 0.9385*** -0.913 -0.0492 
 [10.18] [13.28] [1.26] [0.09] 
Obs. 234 236 186 187 
R-Squared 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.5 









Table 6: Robustness Tests. Dependent variable: Girls/Boys in Primary and Secondary 
and Tertiary Education (Ratio). Cross section for the year 1991. 
OLS with robust standard errors 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 





POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive 0.0269***  0.0054  
 [3.33]  [0.13]  
Democracy-Dictatorship  0.0555  -0.0155 
  [1.33]  [0.08] 
log GDP per capita 0.0624*** 0.0554*** 0.2363 0.2339 
 [3.87] [2.73] [1.49] [1.44] 
Trade Openness 0.1416*** 0.1550** 0.4259* 0.431 
 [2.71] [2.40] [1.71] [1.64] 
Constant 0.2289** 0.3792*** -1.1508 -1.1076 
 [2.06] [3.18] [1.26] [1.21] 
Obs. 50 50 31 31 
R-Squared 0.54 0.47 0.40 0.40 




Table 7: Robustness Tests. Dependent variable: Girls/Boys in Primary and Secondary 
and Tertiary Education (Ratio). Cross section for the year 2003. 
OLS with robust standard errors 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 





POLITY IV – Constraints on 
Chief Executive 0.0197***  0.0412*  
 [2.85]  [1.74]  
Democracy-Dictatorship  0.0471*  0.0379 
  [1.98]  [0.42] 
log GDP per capita 0.0544*** 0.0549*** 0.2982*** 0.2981*** 
 [5.69] [4.66] [7.21] [7.27] 
Trade Openness 0.0510* 0.0515 0.2873* 0.3706** 
 [1.88] [1.65] [1.91] [2.20] 
Constant 0.4180*** 0.4874*** -1.5425*** -1.4112*** 
 [5.02] [6.02] [5.96] [5.50] 
Obs. 57 58 48 49 
R-Squared 0.53 0.48 0.72 0.68 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
 
 
 
